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Abstract
This paper investigates the choice of children’s activities in India and pro-
vides recommendations for areas where policy intervention to promote schooling
and combat child labor would be most successful. First, we recognize that child
schooling and labor are not the only activities that children can engage in and
include idleness as one of the choices. Second, we use a hierarchical model with
spatially correlated random effects to analyze the determinants of the choice of
children’s activities. Lastly, we recommend that pro-schooling intervention be im-
plemented in districts with favorable attitudes towards schooling and unfavorable
attitudes towards idleness, while anti-child-labor interventions be implemented in
districts where attitudes towards child labor are less favorable. We thus identify
two groups of Indian districts to target appropriate government interventions.
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1 INTRODUCTION
It is well established that education is critical in generating and sustaining economic
development. According to the United Nations (1948), education also constitutes a basic
human right of every child. Nevertheless, the 2001 census of India shows that more
than 90 million Indian children are not attending school.1 Whatever the reasons are for
children not attending school but instead remaining idle or working, government policies
can be used to improve human capital investments. In addition to making primary
education free in public schools, India’s efforts to increase schooling include a variety of
programs that aim to improve the quality and quantity of schools. These include the
Operation Blackboard, District Primary Education, and School Meal programs, among
others. Despite these efforts, a large proportion of Indian children remain uneducated,
a reason for which could be incorrect targeting of these policies. If unobservable factors
make certain households less likely to send their children to school but more likely to
keep them idle or send them to work, then neither otherwise sound education policies nor
child labor laws can be effective in improving these children’s human capital prospects.
In this paper, we summarize the unexplained component of parents’ decisions to send
their children to school, work, or neither school nor work in India. Rather than focus
solely on schooling and child labor as the only activities available to children, one of
our contributions to the existing literature is that we include idleness as a third activity
that children may engage in.2 This assumption is supported by empirical evidence for
India, where approximately 20% of children are idle compared to 5% engaged in child
1In the 5-14 age-group, 90,465,708 children don’t attend school full time or part time. Of these
43,232,941 are boys and 47,243,455 are girls. These constitute 36% of all children, 33% of boys, and
39% of girls.
2For India, idle children have been excluded from most empirical research even though they consti-
tute a larger proportion than working children. The exception is Deb & Rosati (2004), who find that
unobserved heterogeneity at the household-level dominates observed income and wealth heterogeneity
in determining child labor, schooling, and idleness among children in India and Ghana.
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labor.3 Accounting for the possibility that children may remain idle is crucial to the
formulation of sound policies. Policies that reduce child labor may not necessarily result
in more schooling if formerly working children remain idle rather than attend school.
Our controls include not only the socio-economic determinants of children’s activities,
but also measures of the quality and quantity of education and the returns to schooling
within a region. We capture the unexplained component of parents’ decisions regarding
their children’s activities in a village-level random effect. Allowing for spatial correla-
tion of district-level random effects, we summarize a district’s unexplained propensity
towards schooling, child labor, and idleness. A district’s unexplained propensity to-
wards an activity may be determined by omitted economic variables that are difficult to
measure. These include, amongst other factors, parents’ expectations of future returns
to schooling and job opportunities for educated labor as well as the quality of edu-
cation available to children. However, non-economic location-specific factors, such as
social norms or culture, may also determine a district’s unexplained propensity towards
children’s activities.
While our analysis does not provide evidence that social norms alone determine dis-
tricts’ unexplained propensities towards children’s activities, it is very likely that social
factors explain these unexplained propensities to some extent. It is well established
that social norms can play a crucial role even in economic decision making as individ-
uals rarely choose their actions in isolation but embedded within their social context
(Bongaarts & Watkins 1996, Rosero-Bixby & Casterline 1993, 1994, Montgomery &
Casterline 1993, Watkins & Danzi 1995).4 According to Bongaarts & Watkins (1996),
three distinct aspects constitute social interactions – the exchange of information and
ideas, the joint evaluation of their meaning in a given context, and social influence that
3These figures are based on calculations using National Sample Survey Organization data for the
year 1999-2000 in India.
4This literature primarily deals with the role of social interactions, both social learning and social
influence, on fertility decisions.
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encourages or constrains behavior and actions. Thus, society’s acceptance or rejection
of certain activities or behavior directly affects their (possibly psychological) cost and
benefits. A social stigma attached to child labor may therefore reduce the willingness of
households to send their children to work. Moreover, through interaction with others,
individuals may change their own attitudes, perceptions, and preferences and – unless
their actual behavior is determined by binding constraints – this may influence their
actions.
Our primary contribution is to prescribe detailed policy recommendations in order
to improve human capital investments in India, based on both observable and unob-
servable determinants of children’s activities. We identify two groups of districts – one
where government interventions to promote schooling, such as building new schools or
providing education subsidies, will have the greatest potential to succeed; the other
where government intervention to reduce the prevalence of child labor, such as pay-
ing poor parents to send their children to school rather than to work, will be most
effective. The first group of districts has both a high unexplained propensity towards
schooling and a low unexplained propensity towards idleness for children. According to
our analysis, these districts most likely embody attitudes that are favorable to schooling
and oppose idleness. Thus, given adequate resources to educate one’s children, parents
in these districts will be most likely to seize opportunities to invest in their children’s
human capital. In the second group of districts, parents have a low unexplained propen-
sity towards sending their children to work, making parents more likely to respond to
anti-child-labor programs.
The following section briefly discusses the related literature and Section 3 describes
our data. Section 4 formalizes the empirical model and discusses the empirical methodol-
ogy. Results are presented in section 5 and section 6 concludes with policy implications.
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW
Many authors have examined parents’ decisions whether to educate their children or
send them to work. In most cases economic factors are found to play an important role.
Basu & Van (1998), Basu (2002), Ranjan (1999), for example, observe that poverty and
credit constraints prevent households from undertaking potentially profitable investment
in human capital as either schooling expenses are too high or child labor is necessary
for survival of the household. Other authors look at the local labor market (Duryea
& Arends-Kuening 2002, Krueger 2002), trade (Edmonds & Pavcnik 2004, Cigno et al.
2002), or economic growth (Barros et al. 1994, Neri & Thomas 2001, Swaminathan
1998). While constraints may prevent children from going to school, a low return to
human capital due to relatively low wages for educated workers (Foster & Rosenzweig
1996, 2004, Kochar 2004) or a high probability of unemployment even for relatively
skilled labor (Da Silva Leme & Wajnman 2000) may discourage children from going
to school. Such children will not necessarily enter the labor market immediately but
remain idle until they are old enough to work.
With respect to previous theoretical and empirical research, there are few studies
that address the non-economic determinants of children’s activities. Lopez-Calva &
Miyamoto (2004) develop a theoretical model that shows how different social norms
of filial obligations in more and less developed countries result in higher child labor
and lower schooling in LDCs. Lopez-Calva (2003) shows how social norms affect child
labor and schooling decisions through a cost associated with the stigma of not sending
one’s children to school. The author then empirically tests the impact of norms in child
schooling and labor outcomes in Mexico and finds that community variables have a
significant effect on individual behavior. In particular, a higher school enrollment ratio
within a community makes a child more likely to attend school while a high prevalence
of child labor puts a child at a higher risk of working, too.
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This paper differs from the existing literature by allowing for spatial correlation in
schooling, child labor, and idleness decisions. Spatial dependence or spatial correla-
tion exists when a variable exhibits a systematic pattern rather than a random assign-
ment across space. The use of spatial methods in estimating reduced form child labor
and schooling decision models can provide additional information on household decision
making that has so far not been treated adequately. School enrollment, child labor, and
idleness are each examined separately in order to measure the unexplained inclination
towards each of these activities.
We summarize the posterior distribution of ranks of district-level random effects,
which measures the unexplained propensity of households in a district towards educa-
tion, child labor, and idleness. Each district-level random effect borrows information
not only from the village-level random effects within that district but also from the
random effects of its neighboring districts, which in turn borrow information from their
respective villages and adjacent neighbors. Thus, our measure of each district’s un-
explained propensity towards an activity captures the unexplained propensity at the
village-level not only among all villages in that district but also among its neighboring
districts’ villages, its neighbors’ neighbor’s villages, and so on throughout the entire
country. Spatial correlation of district-level unobservables has implications for policy
as well. If policies are effective in the two groups of districts presented in this paper,
there may be positive spillovers into neighboring districts, neighbors’ neighbors, and so
on throughout the country. Over time, therefore, the entire economy may benefit from
targeted intervention.
3 DATA
Our data come from 4 sources. The majority of our data consist of household-level
variables which come from the 55th Round of the Employment and Unemployment
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Schedule of the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) for the year 1999-2000.
These variables include household-level socio-economic predictors of schooling, child
labor, and idleness – i.e. household composition, parental education, caste, religion, per
capita expenditure, land ownership, sector of residence, and season indicators. Using this
data, we also calculate district-level measures of returns to education – i.e. the average
wage for different education groups within a district.5 Our second data source is the
55th Round of the Consumer Expenditure Schedule of the NSSO, from which calculate
district level poverty measures – the head count ratio – which is a measure of absolute
poverty in a district. The Census of India, 1991, provides information on public good
provision for Indian villages. From this we calculate the proportion of villages within a
district that have access to a primary, middle, and high school. Finally, state level data
on the quality of schooling – i.e. the teacher-pupil ratio – in 1997-1998 is obtained from
Selected Educational Statistics, published by the Department of Education in India.
Child laborers, according to the International Labor Organization and the Indian
Census, consist of children in the age group 5-14 years who are economically active -
i.e. those who earn a wage or whose labor results in output for the market. Our sample
includes children aged 5 to 14 years to adhere to the ILO’s definition of child labor.
Our data allow us to identify 6 distinct groups of children. Of these, 3 groups consist
of children engaged in a single activity full time – i.e. school, work, and neither school
nor work (idleness). The remaining 3 groups consist of children engaged in 2 part time
activities – i.e. school and work, school and idleness, and work and idleness. Since
the latter 3 groups are extremely small, we focus on the first 3 groups of children and
estimate regressions for full time school, child labor, and idleness separately. The NSSO
data reports the principal and subsidiary activities of all individuals during each day
5In order to estimate our regressions we use data for 28 states and union territories, which includes
71 regions and 408 districts. Each region consists of a group of contiguous districts that share similar
cropping patterns and population density. Because we estimate spatial regressions we have to exclude
districts that have no adjacent neighbors.
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of the week prior to the survey. Rather than report the hours spent in each activity,
two levels of intensity are reported – either full or half intensity per day. We identify
children who attend school (work or remain idle) full time as those who report attending
school (working or being idle) with full intensity for all seven days of the past week.6
Children who attend an educational institution are defined as attending school. We
include as child laborers all children working in the market, a household enterprise,
or those engaged in domestic duties. We include children engaged in domestic duties
as child laborers because domestic duties constitute ‘work’ rather than ‘leisure’ since
domestic work includes mostly cooking, cleaning, and taking care of younger siblings.
While market and household enterprise work is performed mostly by boys, girls perform
the majority of domestic chores in Indian households. We extend the standard concep-
tual framework to include the possibility of children who neither work nor attend school
but instead remain idle.
We include idle children in our analysis not only because they constitute a large group
in India but also because they could include children who work. This group consists both
of children who are idle because they are looking for work and of those who don’t need
to work for economic reasons. The latter group consists of children whose parents either
cannot afford to educate them – tuition and school supplies may be too expensive, or
education may be too inconvenient due to the scarcity or distance of schools – and those
whose parents see no economic nor non-economic benefit from educating them. These
children may also include those who work in the market or in a household enterprise
and whose parents report them as idle simply to avoid reporting them as child laborers.
6Even though all children attend school during five or at most six days of the week, these children
report full intensity of attending school on seven days because they spend their free time engaged in
homework or other school-related activities rather than in work or idleness. Defining participation in
full time school as those who report attending school with full intensity for five or more days (or six
or more days) of the past week does not change our regression results significantly. Similarly, using
the usual activity of children during the past year to measure school, work, and idleness provides
qualitatively similar results.
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However, such under-reporting of child labor and over-reporting of idleness is more likely
in regions where parents are aware that child labor is illegal – i.e. in more developed
and urban regions. Idle children may also include those engaged in domestic chores,
who are mostly girls who perform household chores like cooking, cleaning, and caring
for younger siblings, even though domestic chores should be considered work rather
than idleness since these tasks constitute economically productive activities. Because
idle children also consist of those who don’t need to work for economic reasons, these
children may be considerably different from those who attend school as well as those
who work. Ignoring the difference may lead to unintended consequences of education
policies. For example, if school is incorrectly thought of as the only alternative to work,
a policy that reduces child work (via a ban on child labor) may simply increase the pool
of idle children rather than increasing school attendance, especially if schooling costs
are high or returns to schooling are low.
Table 1 shows the proportion of Indian children, boys, and girls engaged in each of
the 6 groups in 1999-2000. Children who only attend school constitute the largest group
(68%), followed closely by idle children (20%), while the proportion of children engaged
in only work is small (5%). Several points are worth mentioning here. First, even though
working children constitute a relatively small group, under-reporting of child labor may
result in many child workers being included as idle children, making this latter group
even more important to study. Second, significant gender disparities with respect to
work, school, and idleness exist in India, with a greater share of boys attending school
than girls (approximately 71% of boys versus 64% of girls). The proportion of boys
engaged in work (3%) is less than girls (7%) since we include domestic chores as work.
Moreover, idle girls constitute a larger group than idle boys (about 22% of girls versus
18% of boys). Not only are there large inter-state differences in the proportion of children
who attend school, work, and remain idle, but also gender disparities are worse in some
9
states than in others, as shown in Table 2.
4 EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
4.1 Estimation
We incorporate spatial correlation into schooling, child labor, and idleness decisions for
children by allowing these outcomes in a given location to depend on the outcomes at
neighboring locations. We estimate a model where location-specific economic and non-
economic factors operate and potentially influence parental decisions regarding school,
work, and idleness for their children. To do this we include a village- or urban-block-
level random effect, which assumes that all households within the same village or urban
block share a common unexplained propensity towards school, work, and idleness.7 We
allow for heteroskedasticity of village-level random effects within a district since all vil-
lages within a district may not be identical in terms of unexplained propensities towards
children’s activities. To capture correlations among location-specific unobservable deter-
minants of children’s activities, we assume that there are spatially correlated unobserv-
ables among adjacent districts so that neighboring districts share similar unexplained
propensities towards children’s activities.8
We estimate three separate equations for children’s participation in work, school, and
neither work nor school. Because our outcomes are binary, we estimate binary probit
7The urban equivalent of a village is an urban-block in the NSS data. Since our analysis includes
both rural and urban areas, we include urban-block-level random effects for urban areas. We use the
term village to represent both villages and urban blocks in the rest of the paper. The entire country
consists of 35 states and union territories, which in turn consists of districts. Each district comprises
several villages and urban blocks. The average number of blocks in a district is 29 villages (rural blocks)
and 35 urban blocks in our data with an average of 7.3 households per block in both rural and urban
areas.
8Even though we model spatial correlation between districts rather than between villages, we ac-
knowledge that the latter is preferable. However, while our data allows us to identify the villages and
urban blocks that each district consists of, it does not provide the names of villages or urban blocks.
Thus, data limitations prevent us from modeling spatial correlation at the village-level. Nevertheless,
if spatial correlation exists at the district level, it should also exist at more disaggregate (village) levels.
We thus model spatial correlation at the district-level, which our data allows us to do.
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models. The probit model assumes that there is a latent variable y∗hvd that can be
expressed as a linear function of variables that affect the probability of participation in
work, school, and idleness. Each household h, residing in village or urban-block v, which
is located in district d, has some utility, y∗hvd, from sending its children to school, work,
or neither school nor work. Besides observable characteristics, Xhvd, that are correlated
with y∗hvd, we assume that there is a village-level random effect δvd which captures village-
level propensities towards child labor, schooling, or idleness. The village-level random
effect δvd is normally distributed with mean γd and variance σ
2
d. These two parameters
capture the mean and variance of village-level propensities towards children’s activities
within district d. We also assume that all districts j in the neighborhood of district d,
Rd, are correlated, where Rd consists of all districts adjacent to district d. We model
spatial correlation using a conditionally autoregressive (CAR) model (Besag 1974, Sun
et al. 1999, Wall 2004).
We estimate the following hierarchical model with 3 levels:
y∗hvd = Xhvdβ + δvd + hvd, hvd ∼ N(0, 1) (1)








The first level of the hierarchical model (Equation (1)) describes the relationship
between the latent utility from work (school or idleness) y∗hvd, observable characteristics
Xhvd, and a village-level random effect δvd. The second level (Equation (2)) summarizes
the distribution of village-level random effects or unexplained propensities towards chil-
dren’s activities, allowing for heteroskedasticity of these effects. The third level of the
model (Equation (3)) describes the spatial dependence between the district-level random
effects, γd, among adjacent districts. The degree of spatial dependency between adja-
cent districts is captured by ω while τ measures the remaining variability. The spatial
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parameter, ω, measures the marginal contribution of the random effects in the neigh-
boring districts on the random effect in district j. The measure of spatial dependency
ω is restricted to be between the reciprocals of the largest and smallest eigenvalues of
the neighborhood weight matrix. Higher values of τ represent less spatial dependence,
meaning that conditional on a district’s neighbors’ values of γ there is still a lot of vari-
ability in the distribution of γd.
9 Since the dependent variable is at the household level
but we only have spatial information at the district level we cannot use spatial probit
models, as in Beron & Vijverberg (2004) and LeSage & Kelley Pace (2009).
The specification in Equation (3) results in a joint distribution for all districts, γ ∼
N(0, B), where B = (ID − ωW )−1T (Besag 1974) and W is the weight matrix with
elements i, j equal to 1 for adjacent districts i and j, and T = diag(τ 2). Although our
specification only shows a district’s dependence on it’s adjacent neighbors, the marginal
representation shows that all the districts in the country are correlated.10 Hence, the
posterior distribution of γd borrows information from two sources: the village level effects
from the villages in the district as well as the district level effects of all other districts
in the country.
The latent variable y∗hvd is unobservable and instead a dummy variable is defined as
yhvd = 1 if one or more child aged 5 to 14 years in household h worked, attended school,
or neither worked nor attended school during the past 7 days and zero otherwise:
yhvd =

1 if y∗hvd > 0
0 otherwise
(4)
The explanatory variables included inXhvd and described in Table 3 include household-
9As mentioned in the Introduction, there is theoretical and empirical justification for assuming a
priori that location-specific unobservables may influence economic outcomes, and that these unobserv-
ables may be spatially correlated (Bongaarts & Watkins 1996, Rosero-Bixby & Casterline 1993, 1994,
Montgomery & Casterline 1993, Watkins & Danzi 1995).
10A district’s unexplained propensity towards an activity is correlated with it’s adjacent neighbors’
unexplained propensities, it’s neighbors’ neighbors unexplained propensities, and so on throughout the
entire country.
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, district-, and state-level controls. Household-level controls include the number of boys
and girls in the household, four dummies each to capture the father’s and mother’s
education levels,11 the natural log of per capita household expenditure, a dummy that
indicates if the household owns more than one acre of land, dummies that indicate
whether or not the household belongs to a low caste (i.e. scheduled caste, scheduled
tribe, or other backward caste) or Muslim religion, a dummy that indicates if the house-
hold lives in an urban area, and three season dummies to capture when the household
was surveyed (July to September is the omitted season). Because district-level income
levels and returns to schooling could influence parental decisions on whether or not to
educate their children, we include a district-level measure of poverty (the head count
ratio)12 and returns to schooling (the natural log of mean hourly wages for our five ed-
ucation groups in both urban and rural sectors). The quality and quantity of education
can also determine whether or not children are educated. To capture the availability
of schools, we include the proportion of villages within a district that have a primary,
middle, and high school. The quality of schools is measured by the teacher-pupil ratio
in primary, middle, and high schools in a given state.13
4.2 Sampling Algorithm
We estimate the posterior distribution of the parameters of the model using the Markov
Chain Monte Carlo simulation methods, specifically the Gibbs sampler (A.E. & Smith
1990, Casella & George 1992) and the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm (Chib & Greenberg
11There are five education groups – less than primary, primary, middle, high school, and college
education. We include dummies for the latter four levels and choose less than primary education as
the omitted group.
12The head count ratio is defined as the proportion of individuals in a district whose monthly income
falls below state- and sector-specific poverty lines. Poverty lines (in Rupees per capita per month) for
rural and urban sectors within each state are obtained from the Planning Commission of the Government
of India.
13State-level rather than district-level measures of the quality of education are included since district-
level measures are not available for India.
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1995). The Gibbs sampler allows us to obtain a sample of draws from the marginal
posterior distributions of the parameters by sequentially sampling from the posterior
distributions, conditional on the latest draws of the other parameters. We follow Chib
and Greenberg (1998) and augment the parameter vector, θ, to include the latent y∗,
and the random effects, δ and γ, so that θ = {β, y∗, δ, γ, ω, σ, τ}.
We use diffuse conjugate prior densities described in the Appendix. The conditional
posterior for β, y∗, δ, and γ are Normal, and for σ and τ are Inverse Gamma and are
simple to sample from. The only parameter for which the conditional posterior distri-
bution does not have a closed form is ω and we use Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to
sample from it. The exact posterior distributions are given in the Appendix.
5 RESULTS
5.1 Regression Results
Before summarizing the unexplained propensities toward children’s activities, which is
the focus of this study, we briefly discuss the results of our regressions. Tables 4, 5, and
6 report the means and standard deviations of the posterior distributions of marginal
effects, evaluated at the sample mean values of the covariates. A * represents variables
for which the 95% posterior probability interval does not include zero.
Household-level variables are significantly correlated with all three outcomes – i.e.
school, work, and idleness. Gender differences exist with respect to household com-
position – the likelihood of school participation increases more with an additional boy
compared to an additional girl while this relationship is reversed for participation in
child labor and idleness. This captures the observed gender bias in children’s activities
in India. More educated fathers and mothers increase participation in school and de-
crease participation in work and idleness. Low caste and Muslim children are less likely
to attend school and more likely to work or remain idle, reflecting the disadvantage
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and possibly discrimination faced by these two groups. Children living in urban areas
are more likely to attend school and less likely to work or be idle compared to children
living in rural areas. Our measure of household income (the natural log of per capita
monthly household expenditure) is positively correlated with schooling and negatively
correlated with idleness, but has no correlation with child labor. On the other hand,
land ownership by the household, which is also a measure of economic status, makes
schooling more likely and idleness less likely but also raises the likelihood of child labor.
The latter result is consistent with the findings of Bhalotra & Heady (2003) for girls but
not for boys in Ghana.14.
Our district-level measure of the quantity of primary schools in a district is nega-
tively correlated with schooling and positively correlated with child labor. Though this
result appears counter-intuitive at first, it could have at least two possible explanations.
First, perhaps a higher number of primary schools come at the expense of the quality of
primary education – i.e. fewer and less qualified teachers, absentee teachers, inadequate
school buildings and equipment, etc. Another explanation for this result may be that
the current education policy is misguided in that primary schools are being constructed
in the wrong districts. If a district has an unfavorable attitude towards schooling, con-
struction of new schools may be ineffective in increasing school attendance and retention
in that district. The proportion of villages with one or more high schools in a district is
however negatively correlated with child labor and idleness, as expected. We find that
a higher teacher-pupil ratio in primary schools in a state is negatively correlated with
schooling and positively correlated with idleness. Again, this result is contrary to our
expectations and may be the result of misguided policy – teachers may be placed in the
wrong districts.
14The authors refer to this result as a wealth paradox since girls from land-rich households, though
wealthier, are more likely to work than girls in land-poor households, which is evidence that child labor
is not completely poverty-driven
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The head count ratio in a district has no correlation with schooling but is negatively
correlated with child labor and positively correlated with idleness. Since the head count
ratio measures the absolute poverty in a district – i.e. the proportion of individuals
whose expenditure falls below their respective state-level poverty line – it may not be
capturing the severity of poverty in that district. Absolute poverty may result in children
being idle: prohibitively high schooling expenses may prevent children from attending
school, but at the same time household poverty may not be so extreme that they need
to send their children to work. The returns to unskilled labor captures an income effect
that dominates any substitution effect. Thus, higher unskilled wages are associated
with less child labor and more idleness. Since the majority of households who send their
children to work or let them remain idle have at least one parent with less than primary
education, higher returns to unskilled labor translates into higher parental income for
these children. This decreases a household’s reliance on children’s incomes, even though
schooling expenses may still be too high for these parents to afford education for their
children. Thus, child labor may fall while idleness may rise.
Our spatial correlation parameter, ω, measures the degree of spatial dependence be-
tween unexplained propensities towards an activity among districts. In other words, ω
measures the marginal contribution of the random effects in the neighboring districts on
the random effect in district j. Our results indicate that only unexplained propensities
towards schooling exhibit substantial spatial correlation, which is strictly positive and
is at the very boundary of the support for ω. As discussed in the Introduction, it is
not only social norms that determine districts’ unexplained propensities towards school-
ing decisions. However, it is very likely that social factors explain these unexplained
propensities to some extent. Even though omitted variables may be an important de-
terminant of child labor and idleness, we find that neighboring districts don’t share
similar unexplained propensities with respect to these activities.
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5.2 Unexplained Propensities Toward School, Work, and Idle-
ness
We examine schooling and idleness separately from child labor for the following reasons.
First, as shown in Figures 1, 2, and 3, there is large overlap of districts that have low
levels of schooling as well as high levels of idleness. However, child labor is high in a very
different group of districts.15 Thus, in most districts where schooling is low, idleness is
also high but child labor is not necessarily high. This observation suggests that districts
where attitudes oppose schooling and favor idleness may not necessarily have attitudes
that find child labor acceptable. Second, previous literature has shown that poverty
and credit constraints are the driving force behind child labor. On the other hand, low
returns to schooling, high unemployment of educated labor, insufficient schools, and
inferior school quality may discourage children from attending school and encourage
them to remain idle. Thus, one set of policies may be necessary to move idle children
into school and another set may be required to stop children from working. For example,
the former set of policies may include improving the quality and quantity of schools,
raising returns to education, and providing other monetary incentives for parents to
educate their children (provision of meals in school, subsidies for school supplies, etc.).
The latter set of policies must provide households with sufficient funds to stop their
children from working even though this may not be sufficient to send these children to
school. Such a policy, though extremely costly, may be the only alternative to a ban on
child labor, which will most likely make displaced children worse off by either moving
them into worse occupations or bringing them closer to starvation.
Since both sets of policies can be extremely costly, especially for developing countries,
15Data from the Census of India, 1991, is used to construct these maps since a census better represents
aggregate patterns of children’s activities than does a sample survey. The percentage of children
attending school, engaged in main work (i.e. worked 6 months or more during the year), and those
who neither attended school nor worked are mapped. 1991 is the latest year for which census data on
schooling, child labor, and idleness is currently available for India.
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we identify a group of districts where policies that are pro-schooling and anti-idleness
will most likely succeed as a result of unexplained propensities that favor schooling and
oppose idleness. We also identify a group of districts where child labor can be more
easily reduced since unexplained propensities oppose child work. Rather than attempt
to change parental attitudes towards children’s activities, we propose that these two
groups of districts be targeted by government policies.
In order to prescribe district-specific policy recommendations, we focus on the dis-
tribution of district-level unexplained propensities, γd, which are informed not only by
the village-level random effects δvd within each district d but also by the district-level
effects of other districts in the country. We summarize the posterior distribution of the
relative ranks of γd in order to identify two groups of districts – the first where schooling
is most likely to increase as a result of less idleness and the second where child labor is
most likely to decrease in response to government policies.
We use the distribution of the posterior predictions of the mean village-level effects
within a district, γd, to create a posterior distribution of ranks for all districts (Laird
& Louis 1989, Hogan & Tchernis 2004). At each iteration we rank the draws from
the distribution of the posterior predictions of the district effect, which can be viewed
as the draws from the posterior distribution of ranks of unexplained propensities. We
summarize the distribution of ranks by computing the probability of being in top and
bottom quintiles of the distribution for each district. We thus generate six different
probabilities for each district d - i.e. the probabilities that the unexplained propensity
towards schooling, child labor, and idleness lie in the top 20% (top-school, top-work,
and top-idle) and bottom 20% (bottom-school, bottom-work, and bottom-idle) of their
respective posterior rank distributions.
We identify the first group of districts – i.e. those where policies that promote
schooling and decrease idleness will most likely succeed – by finding districts that have
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a high unexplained propensity towards schooling and a low unexplained propensity
towards idleness. To do this we identify a group of 25 districts in Table 7 where top-
school and bottom-idle are both between 90% and 100% (5 districts), 80% and 90% (4
districts), 70% and 80% (6 districts), and 60% and 70% (10 districts). These districts
have a high unexplained propensity towards schooling as well as a low unexplained
propensity towards idleness and will most likely respond to policies that aim to increase
schooling. Table 8 presents a group of 37 districts where anti-child-labor policies are
most likely to succeed – i.e. where bottom-work is between 90% and 100% (5 districts),
80% and 90% (9 districts), 70% and 80% (12 districts), and 60% and 70% (11 districts).
These districts have a low unexplained propensity towards child labor and will most
likely respond to policies that aim to reduce child work.
6 CONCLUSION
The primary contribution of our paper lies in measuring and summarizing the unex-
plained component towards children’s activities, after controlling for a wide range of
socio-economic determinants of child labor, schooling, and idleness in Indian districts.
The relevance of our analysis lies in the realization that if children’s participation in
work, school, or idleness has even some non-economic connotations, policy prescriptions
are very different than if children’s activities are driven entirely by poverty, school access
and quality, and household socio-economic variables. While we do not claim and cannot
provide evidence that a district’s unexplained propensity towards an activity is driven
entirely by social norms, it is reasonable to assume that at least some part of the un-
explained component is influenced by social acceptance and rejection of schooling, child
labor, or idleness. If one’s social context plays a significant role in determining children’s
activities then policies that attempt to change social attitudes in favor of education and
against idleness and child labor become may increasingly important. However, chang-
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ing social attitudes is a gradual, long term, and non-trivial process. Therefore, rather
than prescribe policies that attempt to make individuals place greater value on edu-
cation and oppose idleness and child work, which should remain a long-term policy
goal, we suggest using more standard policies in the short run. In addition, instead
of implementing these policies throughout the country, we suggest focusing on a small
group of districts where our analysis predicts these policies will be most effective. For
example, pro-schooling and anti-idleness propensities are highest in Warangal (Andhra
Pradesh), Kodagu (Karnataka), and Chhindwara (Madhya Pradesh), so pro-schooling
policies may be most effective in these districts. On the other hand, anti-child-labor poli-
cies may most likely succeed in Dharwad (Karnataka), Bolangir and Sonepur (Orissa),
and Chittaurgarh (Rajasthan) – which are the districts with the most anti-child-labor
propensities.
For the first group of districts – i.e. those that we identify as being pro-schooling
and anti-idleness – policies that improve the quantity and quality of schools may be
extremely successful. Building new schools, hiring more and better teachers, investing
in school supplies and infrastructure, improving transportation to and from schools,
and providing school meals are all policies that can make parents more likely to send
their children to school rather than let them remain idle. This is especially true if these
parents favor schooling and oppose idleness and keep their children out of school because
of a scarcity of schools, inadequate quality of education, or poor infrastructure. For the
group of districts that are anti-child-labor, we suggest policies that can help parents
remove their children from the labor market. Providing these parents with part or all of
their children’s wages will enable them to stop their children from working. Moreover,
providing free part- or full-time education to these children in addition to their foregone




We can rewrite the model in the vector notation
Y ∗ = Xβ + Cδ + ,  ∼ N(0, 1)
δ ∼ N(QΓ,Σ)
Γ ∼ N(0D, (I − ωW )−1T ),
where Y ∗ is the stacked vector of y∗hvd, h = 1, . . . , H, v = 1, . . . , V, and d = 1, . . . , D, C
is an indicator matrix of size H × V with elements Chv = 1 if household h is located in
village v, where Q is an indicator matrix of the size V × D with elements Qvd = 1 if
village v is located in village d, and Σ = diag(Q{σ2d}), T = IDτ 2.
The Gibbs sampler draws from conditional distributions of each of the parameters
in θ, conditional on the last value of the other parameters. We use the notation a|θ−a to
denote the conditional distribution of parameter a, conditional on all other parameters.
1. Sample β|θ−β from a Normal distribution
p(β|θ−β) ∝ N(a,A),
A = (B−1 +X ′X)−1,
a = A(B−1b+X ′Zβ),
where the prior of β is N(b, B), and Zβ = Y
∗ − Cδ. We use a diffuse prior with
mean zero and variance of 1000.
2. Sample δ|θ−δ from a Normal distribution
p(δ|θ−δ) ∝ N(δˆ, ∆ˆ),
∆ˆ = (Σ−1 + C ′C)−1,
δˆ = ∆ˆ(Σ−1(QΓ) + C ′Zδ),
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where Zδ = Y
∗ −Xβ.
3. Sample y∗hvd from a truncated Normal distribution, where truncation is to the
positive side if yhvd = 1, or negative side otherwise, from
y∗hvd ∼ N(Xhvdβ + δvd, 1)
4. Sample γ|θ−γ from a Normal distribution
p(γ|θ−γ) ∝ N(g,G),
G = ((ID − ωR)T−1 +Q′Σ−1Q)−1,
g = G(Q′Σ−1δ).
5. Sample ω|θ−ω
We use the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to sample the spatial correlation pa-
rameter, ω, with autoregressive proposal density as follows: q(ωt|ωc) = ωc + u,
where u ∼ N(0, σ2), and σ2 is a tuning parameter. The prior distribution of ω,
denoted by pi(ω), is uniform between the reciprocals of the highest and lowest








where f(γ|Ψ(·)) is the kernel of the distribution of γ conditional on Ψ(·) from level
III of the model, and Ψ = (I − ωW )−1, where Wij = I(j ∈ Ri).
6. Sample σ2d|θ−σd from an Inverse Gamma distribution








(δvd − γd)2 + βs)/2,
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where the prior distribution of σ2d ∼ IG(αs, βs), αs = βs = 0.001
7. Sample τ |θ−τ from an Inverse Gamma distribution
p(τ 2|θ−τ2) ∝ IG(t1, t2),
t1 = (D + αt)/2,
t2 = ((AΓ)
′AΓ + βt)/2,
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Table 1: Proportion of Children 5-14 Years Engaged in Work, School, & Neither Work
Nor School in India: 1999-2000
Activity All Children Boys Girls
Work 5.16 3.29 7.24
School 67.92 71.25 64.22
Idle 19.87 18.24 21.69
Work & School 0.83 0.81 0.85
Work & Idle 0.47 0.45 0.49
School & Idle 5.75 5.95 5.51






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































father − primary 0.0860 0.0074*
father −middle 0.1059 0.0072*
father − high 0.1195 0.0082*
father − college 0.1428 0.0136*
mother − primary 0.0391 0.0074*
mother −middle 0.0300 0.0090*
mother − high 0.0380 0.0104*






oct− dec 0.0312 0.0075*
jan−march 0.0281 0.0086*
april − june 0.0126 0.0079
primary − schools -0.2335 0.0502*
middle− schools 0.1027 0.1090
high− schools -0.0083 0.1175
poverty -0.0497 0.0684
lnhrwage− < primary -0.0207 0.0320
lnhrwage− primary -0.0019 0.0366
lnhrwage−middle 0.0088 0.0321
lnhrwage− high -0.0333 0.0261
lnhrwage− college -0.0219 0.0316
teacher − pupil − ratio− primary -0.0043 0.0011*
teacher − pupil − ratio−middle -0.0015 0.0012
teacher − pupil − ratio− high -0.0024 0.0012
spatial correlation parameter (ω) 0.0899 0.0228*
Number of Observations 49186
Source: National Sample Survey Organization, Employment & Unemployment
Schedule, Round 55. Columns (2) and (3) report the means and standard
deviations of the posterior distributions of regression coefficients, evaluated at
the sample mean values of the covariates. A * represents variables for which
the 95% posterior probability interval does not include zero.
31








father − primary -0.0213 0.0023*
father −middle -0.0284 0.0028*
father − high -0.0417 0.0034*
father − college -0.0593 0.0059*
mother − primary -0.0318 0.0034*
mother −middle -0.0420 0.0045*
mother − high -0.0534 0.0051*






oct− dec -0.0062 0.0022*
jan−march -0.0094 0.0024*
april − june -0.0087 0.0023*
primary − schools 0.0331 0.0086*
middle− schools 0.0167 0.0206
high− schools -0.0330 0.0144*
poverty -0.0387 0.0101*
lnhrwage− < primary -0.0156 0.0065*
lnhrwage− primary 0.0041 0.0043
lnhrwage−middle -0.0062 0.0040
lnhrwage− high -0.0042 0.0045
lnhrwage− college -0.0082 0.0050
teacher − pupil − ratio− primary 0.0004 0.0002
teacher − pupil − ratio−middle 0.0004 0.0002
teacher − pupil − ratio− high -0.0001 0.0001
spatial correlation parameter (ω) 0.0044 0.0295
Number of Observations 49186
Source: National Sample Survey Organization, Employment & Unemployment
Schedule, Round 55. Columns (2) and (3) report the means and standard
deviations of the posterior distributions of regression coefficients, evaluated at
the sample mean values of the covariates. A * represents variables for which
the 95% posterior probability interval does not include zero.
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father − primary -0.0867 0.0070*
father −middle -0.1024 0.0071*
father − high -0.1273 0.0078*
father − college -0.1556 0.0129*
mother − primary -0.0522 0.0075*
mother −middle -0.0604 0.0087*
mother − high -0.0631 0.0118*






oct− dec 0.0056 0.0076*
jan−march 0.0191 0.0076*
april − june 0.0620 0.0083*
primary − schools 0.0426 0.0301
middle− schools 0.0236 0.0693
high− schools -0.1253 0.0527*
poverty 0.2128 0.0328*
lnhrwage− < primary 0.0458 0.0236*
lnhrwage− primary -0.0188 0.0179
lnhrwage−middle -0.0038 0.0176
lnhrwage− high 0.0026 0.0152
lnhrwage− college 0.0147 0.0189
teacher − pupil − ratio− primary 0.0062 0.0006*
teacher − pupil − ratio−middle -0.0021 0.0007*
teacher − pupil − ratio− high -0.0008 0.0005
spatial correlation parameter (ω) 0.0132 0.0304
Number of Observations 49186
Source: National Sample Survey Organization, Employment & Unemployment
Schedule, Round 55. Columns (2) and (3) report the means and standard
deviations of the posterior distributions of regression coefficients, evaluated at
the sample mean values of the covariates. A * represents variables for which
the 95% posterior probability interval does not include zero.
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Figure 1: Proportion of Children Attending School: Indian Districts, 1991
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Figure 2: Proportion of Children Neither Attending School Nor Working: Indian Dis-
tricts, 1991
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Figure 3: Proportion of Children Engaged in Child labor: Indian Districts, 1991
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Table 7: Pro-Schooling and Anti-Idleness Districts: India, 1999-2000
Cutoff (%) District State Schooling(%) Idleness(%)
All Boys Girls All Boys Girls
90 Warangal Andhra Pradesh 12.55 14.07 10.94 16.73 14.81 18.75
90 Kodagu Karnataka 84.76 80.39 88.89 10.48 15.69 5.56
90 Chhindwara Madhya Pradesh 49.43 47.00 52.63 21.02 23.00 18.42
90 Pali Rajasthan 69.79 88.64 53.85 11.46 4.55 17.31
90 Dungarpur Rajasthan 50.44 71.19 27.78 24.78 18.64 31.48
80 Idukki Kerala 87.76 86.96 88.46 4.08 4.35 3.85
80 Vidisha Madhya Pradesh 62.60 66.18 58.73 30.53 27.94 33.33
80 Cuttack, Jagatsinghpur Orissa 80.65 85.39 76.29 16.85 14.61 18.90
80 Mongam Sikkim 78.05 75.44 80.30 17.89 19.30 16.67
70 Shahdol Madhya Pradesh 60.11 67.11 55.14 23.50 21.05 25.23
70 Chhimtuipui Mizoram 53.55 59.26 47.30 40.00 34.57 45.95
70 Zunheboto Nagaland 93.55 100.00 90.91 3.23 0.00 4.55
70 Nagaur Rajasthan 64.09 77.87 46.94 21.82 14.75 30.61
70 Udaipur, Rajsamand Rajasthan 69.25 78.73 59.02 17.84 14.03 21.95
70 Chittaurgarh Rajasthan 71.94 83.33 59.70 17.27 9.72 25.37
60 Darrang, Sonitpur Assam 64.60 70.55 57.33 21.20 17.82 25.33
60 Sitamarhi Bihar 41.30 43.65 38.46 52.61 53.17 51.92
60 Bhavnagar Gujarat 11.02 11.57 10.48 17.96 17.36 18.55
60 Sidhi Madhya Pradesh 67.86 78.05 53.45 25.71 20.73 32.76
60 Lunglei Mizoram 17.99 18.09 17.89 28.57 21.28 35.79
60 Wokha Nagaland 97.22 100.00 94.12 2.78 0.00 5.88
60 Ajmer Rajasthan 76.21 85.48 65.05 14.54 7.26 23.30
60 Kanniyaikumari Tamil Nadu 94.57 96.23 92.31 2.17 1.89 2.56
60 Ballia Uttar Pradesh 69.31 70.75 67.47 23.81 24.53 22.89
60 Haora West Bengal 77.55 76.96 78.19 17.60 19.12 15.96
Source: National Sample Survey Organization, Employment & Unemployment Schedule, Round 55. Some districts are grouped
together since these have split into two or more districts since 1999-2000. The last six columns report the actual proportion of
children, boys, and girls who attend school and are idle in these districts, according to the NSSO data.
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Table 8: Anti-Child-Labor Districts: India, 1999-2000
Cutoff (%) District State Child Labor(%)
All Boys Girls
90 Dharwad Karnataka 8.65 7.35 10.00
90 Bolangir, Sonepur Orissa 2.63 1.14 4.69
90 Chittaurgarh Rajasthan 10.79 6.94 14.93
90 Gyalshing Sikkim 2.68 1.40 4.24
90 Tiruchirappalli Tamil Nadu 1.64 1.60 1.69
80 Dibang Valley Arunachal Pradesh 1.52 1.25 1.92
80 Samastipur Bihar 4.76 2.56 7.02
80 Ranchi Bihar 4.32 2.53 6.02
80 Gandhinagar Gujarat 9.52 5.00 13.64
80 Chhindwara Madhya Pradesh 10.80 9.00 13.16
80 Bombay Maharashtra 1.46 0.59 2.33
80 Osmanabad Maharashtra 2.61 1.79 3.39
80 Latur Maharashtra 4.42 3.70 5.08
80 Bhilwara Rajasthan 18.01 16.05 20.00
70 Junagadh Gujarat 5.59 1.74 10.00
70 Vadodara Gujarat 9.64 5.60 13.71
70 Sirampur Himachal Pradesh 1.65 0.00 3.23
70 Mandhya Karnataka 5.65 4.62 6.78
70 East Nimar Madhya Pradesh 1.74 1.03 2.67
70 Amravati Maharashtra 1.74 1.09 2.50
70 Jaintia Hills Meghalaya 4.05 6.45 2.33
70 Ganjam, Gajapati Orissa 10.02 5.96 13.93
70 Pali Rajasthan 18.75 6.82 28.85
70 Kota, Baran Rajasthan 3.55 0.71 6.34
70 Basti, Sidharthanagar Uttar Pradesh 13.46 5.22 22.22
70 Hooghly West Bengal 6.30 2.97 10.06
60 Sibsagar, Golaghat, Jorhat Assam 2.83 2.52 3.13
60 Bhind Madhya Pradesh 2.50 0.00 6.25
60 Shajapur Madhya Pradesh 15.60 4.92 29.17
60 Mandla Madhya Pradesh 9.73 6.67 13.21
60 Bishnupur Manipur 0.59 0.00 1.20
60 Cuttack, Jagatsinghpur Orissa 2.33 0.00 4.47
60 Jaipur, Dausa Rajasthan 5.29 1.14 9.94
60 North Arcot Tamil Nadu 4.73 3.15 6.17
60 Azamgarh, Maunath Bhanjan Uttar Pradesh 6.13 3.76 8.75
60 Jaunpur Uttar Pradesh 4.42 2.22 6.92
60 Ballia Uttar Pradesh 6.35 3.77 9.64
Source: National Sample Survey Organization, Employment & Unemployment Schedule, Round 55. Some
districts are grouped together since these have split into two or more districts since 1999-2000. The last
three columns report the actual proportion of children, boys, and girls who work in these districts, according
to the NSSO data.
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